Mexico, Federal Reserve Policy and Danger Ahead for Emerging Markets

On August 27th, I had the opportunity to address the Aspen Institute, UNIFIMEX and PWC in Mexico City during a Q&A with Patricia Armendariz. Subsequenty, on August 28th, I gave the opening talk at the annual IMEF conference. The main issues of concern to local Mexican banks, as well as to Mexico's central bank, are:

1) How the Federal Reserve's (and to a lesser extent ECB's and People's Bank of China) policies and actions have, and wlil continue to impact their currency and interest rate levels, and

2) The risks posed by the structural, and ongoing problems of too-big-to-fail banks, which remain as much a US as a Mexican problem as manifested by heightened economic, market and financial stress.

I posted the slides from my talk here, including the ten main risks that Mexico (and really all countries) are facing today, as well as the four factors of volatility that I have spoke about many times before. Much uncertainly emanates from central bank policy and the associated artificial stimulation of mega banking institutions and capital markets throughout the world. There is no foreseeable remedy to the long-term damage already caused, and that will continue to grow in the future.

What follows is a related piece that I co-authored with researcher, Craig Wilson that first appeared in Peak Prosperity:

Too big to fail is a seven-year phenomenon created by the most powerful central banks to bolster the largest, most politically connected US and European banks. More than that, it’s a global concern predicated on that handful of private banks controlling too much market share and elite central banks infusing them with boatloads of cheap capital and other aid. Synthetic bank and market subsidization disguised as ‘monetary policy’ has spawned artificial asset and debt bubbles - everywhere. The most rapacious speculative capital and associated risk flows from these power-players to the least protected, or least regulated, locales.  

The World Bank and IMF award brownie points to the nations offering the most ‘financial liberalization’ or open market, privatization and foreign acquisition opportunities. Yet, protections against the inevitable capital outflows that follow are woefully inadequate, particularly for emerging markets.

The financial world has been focused largely on the volatility of countries like China and Greece recently. But Mexico, the third largest US trading partner (after Canada and China), has tremendous exposure to big foreign banks, and the largest concentration of foreign bank ownership of any country in the world (mostly thanks to NAFTA stipulations.)

In addition, the latitude Mexico has provided to the operations of these foreign financial firms means the nation is more exposed to the fallout of another acute financial crisis (not that we’ve escaped the last one).

There is no such thing as isolated “Big Bank” problems. Rather, complex products, risky practices, leverage and co-dependent transactions have contagion ramifications, particularly in emerging markets whose histories are already lined with disproportionate shares of debt, interest rate and currency related travails.

Mexico has benefited to an extent from its proximity to the temporary facade of US financial health buoyed by Fed policy, but as such, it faces grave dangers should any artificial bubble pop, or should the value of the US dollar or US interest rates rise.

There are other clouds forming on Mexico’s horizon. In the past month, the Mexican stock market has fallen 6 percent. Its highs were last seen in September, 2014. Shares in the nation’s largest builder, Empresas ICA SAB, just fell to a 12-year low as lower growth expectations.

(Source)

Because of currency misalignments based on central bank machinations, the Mexican Peso sits near all time lows vs. the US dollar. The Central Bank of Mexico just announced a currency boosting round of $8.6 billion of Pesos over the next two months, with likely more to come. This impinges upon its reserves. (Source)

Mid-level Mexican financial firms will struggle with access to credit should the air in the tires of this global liquidity boosting exercise continue to leak out. Other problems loom on Mexico’s horizon based on a host of interrelated factors.

These include the potential of capital flight, liquidity loss, over-reliance on external debt and investors, oil price declines (oil revenues account for about one-third of Mexico’s federal government budget), economic downturn in the US or Mexico, and rising volatility due to central bank policy shifts impacting interest rates and currency relationships, geo-politics, credit defaults, or additional big bank crimes.

The high concentration of large banks in Mexico and in the US presents extra systemic risk. Local Mexican firms and individuals, as well as foreign investors should consider these co-mingled factors and hedge against them for protection.

Capital Flight due to US Rate Hikes, Real or Anticipated

The possibility of US rate hikes, or even the threat of them, could freeze demand for non-US stocks and bonds - everywhere. If we learned anything from the US financial crisis, economic hardship in Greece and other Southern European countries, and the rout in the Chinese stock market, it’s that capital flight, particularly leveraged capital flight, can crucify an economy, especially high debt burdens accentuate the process.

Mexico, though somewhat protected from financial upheaval during the first leg of the 2008 financial crisis, may be the next victim of capital’s mercurial tendencies for that very reason. Mexico’s relative stability and liberalized financial markets have invited more foreign capital through these channels, which means more can leave to return to headquarter countries, or seek opportunities elsewhere, in emergencies.

In addition, heightened “de-risking” (or the reducing of counter-party agreements and cross-border remittances between the US and Mexico) will impact future remittance flows. Though de-risking practices are officially designated to thwart money launderers and drug-dealers – the true effect of the closing of bank branches or reduction of services that enable remittance flows burdens the population and the local banks that rely on them.

Big Bank Concentration and Counterparty Risk

Mexico’s domestic bank concentration problems have marginally improved since the financial crisis, but not by much. As of 2014, just five of Mexico’s private sector banks hold 72 percent of all financial assets. The top two, Banamex, a unit of Citigroup Inc., and BBVA Bancomer, a unit of Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, hold 38 percent of all assets. (Source) (Source)

Concentration has accelerated in the US. Since the financial crisis, the Big Six US banks (JPM Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley) have grown in terms of assets, deposits, cash, trading assets and derivatives volume.

In terms of counter-party risk, from a credit and derivative perspective, the fewer banks operating in any sphere, the greater the risk that a collapse in any one of them triggers a domino effect in the others. The main foreign banks in Mexico, and those engaging in business with Mexican banks, can quickly close services and shift capital and credit from the country, or place barriers to retrieve it, in a pinch.

Ongoing US Bank Bailouts and Mexican Fallout

The US Federal Reserve buying program, though officially over, has rendered the Fed the largest hedge fund in the world, with a $4.5 trillion book of securities, more than a dozen times the figure of seven years earlier. The mortgage backed securities component remains at about $1.5 trillion, up from zero seven years ago.

Mexico was fortunate not to have been on the US bank radar screen to receive, or be induced to borrow against, the $14 trillions of dollars of toxic US-bank made assets. US bankers mostly focused on selling these subprime assets into Europe. Thus, Mexico escaped the fallout that countries like Greece and Spain felt.  

Still, Mexico’s financial conditions are showing increasing signs of weakness, despite comparatively low inflation and, as a result, the ability to keep interest rates around 3 percent (the same as in Chile) below those in Columbia and Peru.

Aside from business problems, the amount of people living in poverty in Mexico increased from 49 million in 2008 to 53 million in 2012. In addition, Mexico came in last of the 34 countries examined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD for inequality. The combination of poverty and inequality on the ground, plus incoming instability on a business and banking basis could prove a disastrous mix in Mexico (and in the US) in the face of possible rising interest rates, a strengthening dollar in the near-term, or enhanced volatility.

EM Debt Defaults and Bond-Stock Divergence

Credit default risk looms as well. The amount of corporate and bank debt issued since the Fed embarked on its zero-interest rate and QE policy and pushed it on the world, has escalated. Thus, rising interest rates or corporate defaults in the US would impact Mexican (and other EM) corporate bond prices and default rates.

The divergence between credit-risk as reflected by rising high-yield bond spreads (up from seven year lows in mid-2014) and equities is predominantly predicated on the 60 percent drop in oil prices this year, which as of August 20^th, hit a six and a half year low. The energy sector represents 15 percent of the high yield market.

Energy stocks have dropped nearly thirty percent. If commodity prices continue falling, other sectors and the stock markets would be more effected. Countries reliant on oil revenues, such as Mexico where 30 percent of the federal budget is based upon them, are impacted directly from profit loss and secondarily by defaults. (Source)

According to a recent report issued by the Institute of International Finance,  “Corporate Debt in Emerging Markets: What should we be worried about?”, emerging market (EM) non-financial corporate debt rose to a record high of 83 percent of GDP, up from 67 percent in 2009.  The total size of the EM non-financial corporate bond market has more than doubled to $2.4 trillion in 2014 vs. 2009.

Between 2015 and 2017, about $645 billion of that debt is set to mature with US dollar denominated bonds comprising $108 billion of that figure. Meanwhile, the volume of non-performing loans and general debt payment burdens have risen on US dollar strength, meaning EM banks, particularly those exposed to high degrees of foreign-currency lending, are increasingly in trouble.

Figure 1 - Source: BIS, IMF, OECD, McKinsey, IIF; Brazil, China, Czech Rep., Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey.

The low or zero interest rate policies from the FED, ECB and even EM central banks have propelled this issuance, particularly in the EM non-financial corporate segment, even in countries where public debt issuance hasn’t also skyrocketed.

Of the $1.7 trillion EM in non-financial corporate debt raised since 2009 in  the international markets, about 30 percent ($510 billion) was in foreign currency, 80 percent of that ($430 billion) was in US dollars. The more reliant on external borrowing, the less stable a borrowing country’s financial situation becomes, and the more prone its firms are to downgrades or defaults as a result of external or internal weakening.

The report notes that higher foreign-currency risk exists in countries like Brazil, Mexico and Korea. In addition, a number of EM countries are holding cash reserves in domestic bank accounts from large percentages of proceeds raised offshore. They would be forced to withdraw from these funds to support currency weaknesses to service debt, which could increase the funding risk of EM banks.

What This All Means

This level of global inter-connected financial risk is hazardous in Mexico, where it’s peppered by high bank concentration risk. No one wants another major financial crisis. Yet, that’s where we are headed absent major reconstructions of the banking framework and the central bank policies that exude extreme power over global economies and markets, in the US, Mexico, and throughout the world.

Mexico’s problems could again ripple through Latin America where eroding confidence, volatility, and US dollar strength are already hurting economies and markets.

The difference is that now, in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s debt crises, loan and bond amounts have not just been extended by private banks, but subsidized by the Fed and the ECB.  The risk platform is elevated. The fall, for both Mexico and its trading partners like the US, likely much harder.

The 2015 Financial Meltdown & More

This week, I had the pleasure of being interviewed by Greg Hunter at USA Watchdog regarding my thoughts on the state of the global markets, economies and commodities into 2015.  Here are some key points we covered. For more detail, please check out the video of our interview here.

1) On the Market Meltdown: When I spoke with Greg about 9 months ago, I said that based on logic and the political-economic history I had explored for All the Presidents’ Bankers, there should have already been another major implosion following the 2008 financial crisis. However, there is an element of history that is unprecedented and which has acted as a barrier, albeit tenuous and fabricated, to another full-blown, transparent crisis. The scope of the zero-interest-rate policy and QE programs that emanated from the US Federal Reserve and have unfolded throughout the world are artificially bolstering market and financial interests as populations falter. In the US, this has been greeted by proclamations of economic victory from the Obama administration. In Europe, it’s harder to tweak the employment stats enough to declare the same thing, and hence, official QE programs there are ongoing. At any rate, this prolonged policy of injecting cheap money into the banks and markets, funded by the public due to the very nature of debt-creation and the purchasing of government and asset-backed debt securities, now surpasses any past measures of such activities in terms of scope and length.

The fact that these policies lasted for six years has inflated and distorted bond and stock markets, as well as the books of the world’s largest financial institutions to such an extent, that inherent ‘value’ in any of these areas is impossible to determine. We are living with the instability of a system that is supported by central bank maneuvers and the leveraging of them, not by anything organic or independently sustainable. Because rates are so low, any establishment with access to this cheap capital, or that has other people's money to burn, is creating bubbles by reaching for returns anywhere - in government bonds, stock markets, leveraged loans in debt-intensive firms like oil and gas, and in complex derivative products consisting of currency, commodity and credit elements.

The idea of funding the entire financial system with no exit plan for any non-crisis producing dissolution or resolution for such support boggles the mind.  This global QE period is larger and more insane that ever in history.  Because SO much cheap money is sloshing around the system at its top echelons, not through the real economy, the false appearance of stability has been perpetuated longer than logic would dictate.  But since global QE is not yet over, its benefits will continue to accrue to the same institutions that are already benefitting from it (the ones that leverage capital or sell bonds) until all the QE plans are over - not tapered, but unwound and done. While this transpires, a meltdown will unfold, but slowly. Meanwhile, this next phase of ECB QE will provide markets and banks more temporary solvency. So will the Bank of Japan’s money supply expansion and the People’s Bank of China version. 

2) On Volatility:  Market and economic volatility will increase this year – punctuated with media headlines like ‘unexpected’.  Last year, we had volatility spikes in August, October and December.  This year, we’ve already had spikes in January.  So, the shocks are coming in more closely and the downsides are deeper.  That’s why we are in a transitioning down period.  At the end of this year, we will have a lower bond and stock market.  The financial system will start to unravel more visibly and in a more sustained manner. The Federal Reserve won’t raise rates (or if they do, it will be at the end of the year, and only once, as it will have a brutal impact) because there is no reason to. Real inflation of people’s costs of living might be higher, but with global QE keeping a lid on rates and a boost on bonds, and with the dollar still strong, Janet Yellen will just continue using terms like ‘patiently.’ Every time major market participants get remotely nervous, the market will dump, and the next FOMC meeting’s language will be conciliatory to assuage the nerves of this flawed system.

3) On the US Dollar: The reason the dollar has remained strong, and the reason it will continue to stay strong for now is not because the ZIRP and QE policies are good, not because so much debt on the books of the country is prudent, and not because our debt to GDP ratio is cost-effective.  Printing cheap money to sustain a system for six years is a negligent policy.  Using money to plaster over a banking system that doesn’t work and has only become more concentrated is not a stability-increasing policy.  Nor has any of this cheap money trickled down to the average person. All those things are horrific.  But, what the dollar has going for it is the unique collaboration and power-position of the US government, private banks and the Fed.  The US had a first mover advantage compared to the rest of the world.  Its QE policies were biggest.  The dollar is propped up artificially by these alliances and ongoing maneuvers. Every other country is doing so badly and will continue to, that the dollar has, and will have, a relatively better value for now.  Eventually, this madness has to play out and the dollar will weaken, but we won’t see a “plunge” in the near term because every other country is struggling. Any downside to the dollar will thus be part of a slower meltdown punctuated by extra volatility.

4) On Gold: The same reason the dollar has stayed strong is why gold hasn’t had a major outbreak to the upside. With so much artificial stimulus and systemic manipulation, the paper-dollar and hard-asset gold are behaving in a zero-sum game relationship where real value or economic measures are meaningless. That said, gold prices will increase this year– but also only gradually, just as the dollar will not dump but will decrease gradually, as all of these QE maneuvers continue to play out.  Again, the stock and bond markets will decline as this artificial aid eventually does, and the movements will be marked by volatility to the downside. But since the artificial aid isn’t actually over, the price direction of everything will remained tempered. We have been underestimating the effect of all the support that has been lavished on the markets and into the banks.  That’s why considering the timing of this next phase is critical. There’s going to be a downward impact on markets.  There’s going to be an upward impact on gold.  It’s just not going to be as huge this year.  It’s going to be a more gradual kind of a year.

5) On the Swiss Central Bank Float Move: The Swiss deciding to detach from pegging to the Euro must be looked at from two perspectives that together characterize the kind of volatility and stab in the dark policies in operation this year. On the one hand, the Swiss rejected the idea of increasing gold reserves last year (indicating, among other things, hesitancy and uncertainty in general,) and the SCB has imposed negative interest rates (as has the ECB.) Both of these move are related to global QE. On the other hand, the Swiss don't want to be pegged to a declining Euro that will result from the next round of more ECB bond buying to be announced by Mario Draghi on January 22nd.  In general, these central banks don’t really know what will happen in the short or long term as these QE and bank-supportive policies play out.  The Swiss can opt out of part of these measures, but have no choice on the rest.  To a large extent, their move was a way to balance both sides.

6) On Ongoing Bank Risk and Concentration: The largest 30 global banks (dubbed “GSIB’s” or globally systemically important banks) control 40 percent of lending and 52 percent of assets worldwide. In the US, since the financial crisis, the Big Six banks’ share of assets has increased by 41.4 percent and their share of deposits has increased by 82.4 percent. Because of the largesse of government and Fed policy, that gets spun as economically beneficial to the American population. The Big Six stockpile of cash meanwhile, which is doing nothing for the public, has nearly quadrupled in size. 

In addition, just 10 US banks hold 97 percent of all bank-trading assets. Of those, JPM Chase holds 43.8 percent and Citigroup holds 24.5 percent.  Then, there’s leveraged loans, the 2010s equivalent of subprime loans. The 2014 issuance of collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, eclipsed that of pre-crisis 2006, run by the same cadre of big banks. In November 2014, regulators found that 1/3 of the $767 billion loans they examined in their annual bank loan review showed “lax reviews of potential borrowers and poor risk management.” Nothing was done about it. Oil and gas loans ($250 billion of them) remain primed for defaults and catalyzing more volatility. Adding to the risk, the top four US derivatives trading banks (JPM Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America) hold $219 trillion of $237 trillion, or 93 percent, of US derivatives. 

That kind of consolidation, nationally and globally is why we’ve had six years of artificially stimulated markets. Those figures are why the benefits of these policies go to the most powerful players but not to anyone else. They are why instability is here to stay and grow.

Silver's Rise

I did an interview with Germany's investigative reporter, Lars Schall, last week. We covered everything from the Middle East Uprisings to Oil Prices to Silver Prices to the still weak global economy. He put the transcript up on his website yesterday. Here's the tidbit on silver, given today's continued hike in that metal:

Question: In general, do you think both metals (silver and gold) will go much higher?

Answer: Yes, I think they will. There is a fundamental weakness in the global economy. There is a fundamental weakness in the U.S. economy. The Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, President Obama, and Treasury Secretary Geithner are all talking about this recovery we are supposed to be in. Apparently, to them, we have been in a recovery since the middle of 2009, but real individuals don’t see that. The less they are finding jobs, the longer they are out of jobs, the more expensive it is to buy food, gas, and other basic items, including their health care, and the more people facing foreclosures amidst the month of lowest housing prices since this ‘recovery’ officially started, the more apparent it is, that we aren’t in a recovery.

We are in a weak, not a stable, situation despite all this talk. The dollar is weak, and that takes money out of the pockets of for instance, Americans, that pay more for imported items, and get less on exporting them. Also, our Treasury debt has gone up from $5.4 to $9.4 trillions in two years, that is an exceptional amount and increase. This is debt with which the government buys its own currency and circularly, its own debt, but it doesn’t get out into the real economy. As long as that is the case, as long as the economy is weak and immense debt is used to prop the dollar, and as long as there exists speculative capital seeking somewhat sure investments, at least short-term, the metal market will continue to go up. There might be days where it comes down on profit taking or other reasons, but in general it will climb higher.

The rest of the interview is here. What do you guys think?