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Entries by Nomi Prins (178)

Sunday
Apr062014

Excerpt: All the Presidents' Bankers: The Justice Department Goes Soft

(This excerpt originally appeared in Truthout within a piece entitled: The Real Vice-President of the United States is Wall Street. Thanks to those that have been debating since whether, "President" could have replaced "Vice-President.") This excerpt comes about 400+ pages into the book. 

The Justice Department Goes Soft on Bankers

Many congressional hearings and investigations have probed the bankers' practices since the crisis that began in 2007. Similar to the Pujo hearings after the Panic of 1907, though, they have resulted in nothing material against the bankers with the strongest political alliances. And unlike the impact of the 1932–1933 Pecora Commission hearings, no substantive regulatory act has passed to significantly alter their behavior. Though banks would end up paying various fines and legal settlements, that amounted to fractions of pennies on the dollar relative to their immense asset bases. Their structure and influence remained unaltered.

As of September 1, 2013, the SEC reported it had levied just $1.53 billion in fines and $1.2 billion in penalties, disgorgement, and other money relief against the big banks for their multitrillion-dollar global Ponzi scheme—or as the SEC put it, "addressing misconduct that led to or arose from the financial crisis." Goldman paid a $550 million fine from the SEC for a similar allegation. The firm admitted no guilt for the related activities. Bank of America paid a $150 million fine without admitting any guilt for misleading shareholders regarding its payment of Merrill Lynch's bonuses when it took over the firm. JPMorgan Chase eventually settled the London Whale probe with a $1.02 billion fine, greater than the fines it paid the government for all of its housing-related infractions. Though the firm admitted that it had violated banking rules by not properly monitoring trading operations, that kind of admission was akin to copping a misdemeanor plea while facing a major felony.

On August 1, 2013, a federal judge approved a $590 million settlement by Citigroup in a shareholder lawsuit accusing the bank of hiding billions of dollars of toxic mortgage assets. On that same day, a jury found former Goldman Sachs banker Fabrice Tourre liable for his role in the Abacus deal, which lost some investors $1 billion. The ruling was dubbed a major victory for the SEC. "We are obviously gratified by the jury's verdict and appreciate their hard work," lead SEC lawyer Matthew Martens said.

The Justice Department chose not to criminally prosecute the chairmen from Goldman or JPMorgan Chase (both of whom ranked in the top twenty for Obama's career campaign contributors) or from anywhere else for creating faulty CDOs, trading against them, dumping them on less knowledgeable investors, or otherwise speculating with capital supposedly siphoned off for more productive and less risky purposes.

Similarly, the Justice Department punted on prosecuting Jon Corzine, the former governor of New Jersey and a top-tier bundler for Obama. Steering his firm MF Global into an abyss, Corzine had bet more than $6 billion on European sovereign debt. The $1 billion MF Global "mistake," the multibillion-dollar losses on bets made by Chase, the CDOs chosen by the firm's biggest hedge fund clients that had been set up to fail—these were apparently just minor events in the scheme of making money and maintaining alliances. On October 31, 2011, MF Global filed Chapter 11, with $41 billion in assets and $39.7 billion in debt, the eighth largest bankruptcy in US history. Four days before the collapse, Corzine sent an email to an employee "to strategize how they could use customer segregated funds [and get JPMorgan Chase] to clear MF Global's trades more quickly." He avoided criminal fraud charges.

The general response of Obama and his cabinet toward Wall Street criminality and the sheer unsavoriness of its leaders showed the degree to which nothing had changed and the lack of commitment to reform. If nothing changes fundamentally in the banking landscape, more and larger crises are a given. The most powerful banks are bigger, more interconnected, and more reliant on cheap money and federal largesse than ever. Their leaders are unrepentant and unaccountable. Their political alliances require nothing of them anymore except some fines that can be easily re-earned.

Copyright of Nomi Prins. Cannot be reprinted without permission of Nation Books.

Monday
Mar172014

The Seven Sins of Wall Street by Bob Ivry - My Book Review

The Seven Sins of Wall Street: Big Banks, their Washington Lackeys, and the next Financial Crisis by Bloomberg reporter, Bob Ivry is both incredibly scary and ironically extremely funny – in a very dark way. This makes it essential reading for anyone with a finely tuned bullshit meter that doesn’t buy the notion that we’re all economically safer now than before the financial crisis of 2008 – which should be everyone. Ivry’s voice is appropriately sardonic and exasperated, his journalism and on-the-foreclosed-ground research, impeccable. His ability to empathize with readers that don’t hold a PhD in financial jargon (derivatives = “four syllables that launched a thousand naps”) allows him to render otherwise arcane topics simple enough to make you want to throw things at Jamie Dimon.

Most people living in the real world have a sense that the Wall-Street-Washington driven crisis hasn’t exactly evaporated into a haze of CEO repentance, or former politicians choosing to become gardeners rather than bagging plush jobs at elite financial firms. But Ivry’s book shows the ongoing crimes are much, MUCH worse than even the most alert or pessimistic of us think.  Not only has there been no meaningful reform or jail terms for committing fraud in broad daylight, but the same Big Six banks at the core of the crisis, are back to their old, and some new tricks, with a pat on the back from Uncle Sam. They are bigger and badder than ever, despite public rhetoric to the contrary.

Ivry divides his book into chapters paralleling the seven sins  - gluttony, wrath, envy, pride, lust, sloth, and greed. He doesn’t just excoriate the big bankers that played, and continue to play, freely and loosely with what he refers to as “Grandma’s money”, but embarks on an investigative search for the people living personal nightmares at the hands of these banks years after the “supposed” economic recovery and great reform myth of Dodd-Frank. Though the banks have supposedly repaid their bailout money with $20 billion interest to the American people (sure, no one got a check, but whatever), Ivry shines a harsh light on this irrelevant political babble. The big banks are not only bigger,  but they are also "fail –i- er” he says. Take note, Stephen Colbert.

Ivry’s aim is “not to re-litigate the bailouts, but to illustrate their legacy.” As he writes, “In the months and years after the financial crisis, the top people in Wall Street and Washington had engineered a closed loop the insured their feet never touched the dirty ground. Wall Street would originate the mortgages, and Washington would buy them. The Treasury would sell debt, and Wall Street would buy it, then sell it back to the Federal Reserve. (This was called “quantitative easing.”) The Federal Reserve would print money, and mostly would use it to push up prices on stocks and all sorts of commodities. Bankers traded derivatives…without anyone in the outside world catching a glimpse of the details. Ordinary people only got in the way.”

Ivry tells the tale of whistle-blower Sherry Hunt at Citi Mortgage who supplied Dick Bowen, her boss, with much of the data he used to first blow the whistle on Citi Mortgage’s quality-control department failures post crisis of 2008. Though she feared losing her job, as he actually did, and was demoted during the process of alerting the federal regulators to Citi’s ongoing frauds and cover-ups, she feared saying nothing more.

Ivry describes a January 2010 staff meeting, in which 1000 Citi Mortgage employees “gathered to listen to pep talks and sales reports. Then it came time to announce the workers of the month award. It went to the quality rebuttal crew.” Quality rebuttal was Citi’s way of stifling employees like Hunt that raised red flags about fraudulent practices.

Ivry’s more emotional passages relate to the efforts that Mark Pittman, fellow reporter-tour-du-force at Bloomberg, made to force the Federal Reserve to disclose details of the loans provided in particular to the Big Six US banks during the crisis that most of the media ignored. Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley got far less from TARP openly, than they got from the Fed behind the scenes. The secrecy surrounding those extra trillions of dollars of loans was what Pittman sought to uncover. Pittman died too young, a moment Ivry captures poignantly, but Ivry continues to forge ahead unveiling ongoing secrets and deception -  no longer at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis, but at the heart of its aftermath. Of Pittman, Ivry writes "He knew what was at stake. Not just money. Not just economic policy. Not just the functioning of the world financial system. But the future of capitalism. The credibility of democracy.”

Ivry reveals the myriad Big Six bank schemes that continue unabated; the shadiness still rampant in the mortgage market, how the Fed is permitting banks with FDIC deposit support to make leveraged bets with Grandma’s money on everything from arcane derivatives to aluminum to copper, the Obama assistance programs that assisted the banks and not borrowers, the disgusting remorseless of Wall Street.

Ivry introduces us to people like Rebecca Black, one of the borrowers forced to leave her home at 698 Hazelwood Road. Her lender, a division of J.P. Morgan Chase called EMC Mortgage was part of Bear Stearns before it was taken over - with government aid - by J.P. Morgan Chase in late 2008. As Ivry says, "overnight borrowing by J.P. Morgan Chase, peaked on October 1, 2008 at $68.6 billion. Jamie Dimon, the lender’s Chief Executive Officer, got $23 million in compensation for 2011. All Rebecca Black got was the landscaping bill (for a house she could no longer afford, in the face of payments that blew up in her face, a by-product of some very shady practices.)

When Ivry visited Hazelwood Road in 2012, it was “four years after bad mortgages triggered a meltdown in the world's most resilient economy.” At the time,  “the biggest banks were reporting record profits and government agencies were trumpeting statistics showing a robust recovery.” On Hazelwood Road, there was just unnecessarily shattered lives, boarded homes and crime After the 2008 financial crisis, “an economic and political apartheid had emerged,” Ivry writes, “Washington, in the form of the federal government and Federal Reserve, the country's bank for banks, sacrificed the common good for the profit of the few.” And so the cycle of crime-and-no-punishment continues.

Ivry concludes with his stance “on the whole too big to fail thing: get rid of it. It's anti-competitive and antidemocratic.” Ivry calls out the Dodd-Frank Act for the sham it is: an Act that did nothing to level the playing field in which the biggest banks enjoy the most government-perks, and the lion’s share of the ability to abuse, and extort from, ordinary citizens. His book is an eye-opener, a wake-up call for those in Washington to get their heads out of Wall Street’s asses, a state unthinkable for most politicians. But, it’s also a wake-up call to us, to be ever more vigilant with every one of our financial dealings, because the worst is yet to come. 

Friday
Mar142014

Power Inequality Dwarfs Income Inequality