The Audacity of Bonuses at MF Global

In the spirit of George Orwell’s Animal Farm commandment: “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal then others” comes the galling news that bankruptcy trustee, Louis Freeh, could approve the defunct, MF Global to pay bonuses to certain senior executives. This, despite the fact that nearly $1.6 billion of customer funds remains “missing” or otherwise partially accounted for, yet beyond the reach of those customers, perhaps forever, since before the firm declared bankruptcy on October 31, 2011.

Another commonality between the MF Global incident and Animal Farm is the abject rewriting, or re-interpretation, of rules. At the farm, the rule ‘No animal shall drink alcohol” was ultimately ‘re-remembered’ as ‘No animal shall drink alcohol to excess.’ Absent opposition to this particular fact alteration, the pigs got drunk. It wasn’t pretty.

The Orwellian nature of finance is spiraling out of control. It was acutely demonstrated during the fall 2008, merge-and-be-bailed period, and subsequently, through mainstream acceptance that “too big to fail” validates the subsidization of reckless banking practices (bail first, ask questions or consider tepid regulation later), and the European debacle.

Three wrinkles of audacity underscore the potential MF Global bonus approvals. First, there is the moral responsibility layer. MF Global, classified as a broker-dealer wasn’t specifically subject to the investment-advisor fiduciary rule that requires ‘systemic safety and soundness’’ with respect to retail customers. But, comingling customers’ funds inappropriately with the firm’s, as former chief, Jon Corzine’s European bets were blowing up, was an abject misinterpretation of the rule's intent.

Aside from that, MF Global lied about funds segregation to its customers, which constitutes fraud. The final page of the firm’s brochure touts “the strict physical separation of clients’ assets from MF Global accounts.”

Separately, MF Global broker-dealer activities were subject to SEC oversight and restrictions on its use of client funds. During any normal investigation, like say for embezzlement, funds should be frozen until issues are resolved. Releasing any bonus pay until this matter is settled is just plain wrong.

The reason for possibly allowing bonuses for MF Global chief operating officer, Bradley I. Abelow, finance chief, Henri J. Steenkamp, and general counsel, Laurie R. Ferber follows the same twisted logic pervading Wall Street: no one else can do the job as well.

These people are apparently so special that despite incompetence, negligence or potential malfeasance in diverting customers’ funds away from their rightful spots, their expertise is critical to the bankruptcy proceeding. In that realm, their ‘job performance’ will help Freeh "maximize value for creditors of the company”. Translation: it will ensure banks like JPM Chase keep their cut, since customers are not creditors. Again, plain wrong.

But forget simple matters of right and wrong for a moment. After all, this is Big Finance: what's most important is not necessarily what’s legal or illegal, but more practically, what you can get away with and what you can’t. In that regard, the sheer impotence of regulators, the Department of Justice, and the FBI are enabling factors in perpetuating financial crimes. 

In early 1933, during the Depression that followed the 1929 Stock market Crash, Democratic president, FDR and Republican Treasury Secretary, William Woodin, declared a bank holiday, during which Treasury Department agents examined banks’ (which included at the time, broker-dealers) books to determine solidity and solvency.

Today, our regulatory bodies are incapable, or simply don’t want to be bothered with, tracing money and returning it to the public customers to whom it belongs. The inability to independently examine MF Global’s books, without its executive involved, reveals the sorry state of our financial system.  In this post-Glass-Steagall-repeal world, the mixing of customer money and speculative betting – whether at a super-market bank or broker-dealer, whether involving subprime loans packages or European Sovereign debt, poses too dangerous a level of complexity. If regulatory bodies can’t, or won’t, diminish the related risk, more concrete Glass-Steagall boundaries throughout the financial framework should be resurrected.

Meanwhile, two senators have taken on the bonus-pay fight. Senator Amy Klobuchar (D., Minn.), member of the Senate Agriculture Committee investigating MF Global, wrote to Freeh that the plan is "unacceptable." Senator Jon Tester (D., Mont.), whose constituency includes a number of farmers with funds in the ‘missing’ category, called it "outrageous.”

On Sunday, Freeh's spokesperson released a statement saying the senators’ concerns were ‘noted’ and a final decision on the bonuses hadn’t been made. But to the extent that the money trails shrouding MF Global’s final moments remain more apparent to its former employees than external examiners, it’s likely the people involved in the wreckage, will be paid extra for sorting thru it. And, that’s an expensive, outrageous, shame.

Pocket-Change SEC Fines: Barely a Bark and No Bite

There's a reason yesterday's announcement that JPM Chase would 'settle' for a fine of $156.3 million, while neither admitting nor denying any wrong-doing, thereby forking over the whopping equivalent of a normal person's weekly grocery budget, pisses people off. Because it's a marginal fleabite on the teflon hand of the nation's second largest bank in terms of punitive pain, and absolutely meaningless in altering the grand scheme of toxic securities creation or  complex financial institution business as usual. 

The trivial settlement appears even tinier in comparison to the financial aid JPM Chase received in the wake of its financial crisis. Despite all of CEO Jamie Dimon's disingenuous, though fervently delivered, remarks to the contrary (he didn't need a bailout, he took it for the 'team' to ensure no bank would be singled out to sport a scarlet 'B' of bailout shame), JPM Chase at one point, during the height of the bank's federal subsidization program, floated on nearly $100 BILLION dollars worth of - exceptional assistance. That figure included: $25 billion from the TARP fund, which has since been repaid, $40.5 billion dollars of new debt backed by the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), which has since been retired, about $6 billion through various aspects of the TARP HAMP program which aided a fraction of underwater borrowers, and $28.8 billion behind its Fed-backed, Treasury-pushed acquisition of Bear Stearns, which is still in place. That's aside from its government aided acquisition of Washington Mutual.

There are those that believe that the bailout program (which they continue to equate to just the $700 billion TARP program) was a success (like the Fed, Treasury Department, or any Administration).

Yet, subsidizing Wall Street's most powerful creatures, altered nothing for the banks that survived, while promulgating ongoing economic pain for the general population caught in the wake of a $14 trillion dollar asset creation machine, which became a globally leveraged $140 trillion still-decaying mess, spurred by rapacious speculation, that sat on just $1.4 trillion of sub-prime loans and various other properties. 

Banks want us to believe that widespread economic pain has nothing to do with them, that they were innocent participants. Maybe they made a few mistakes - for which they're paying SEC directed fines, but hey, we all do.

Meanwhile, the budget bantering that drones on in Washington keeps missing the fact that part of the bank subsidization process remains on the Fed's books. This includes $1.6 trillion dollars in EXCESS bank reserves - i.e. reserves for which the Fed is paying banks 0.25% to NOT lend, about $900 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities, and $1.5 trillion worth of Treasuries, partly from the QE2 program. That's an awful lot of captive non-stimulus. It sure isn't helping drive job creation or small business expansion sitting there.

Of course, this latest SEC settlement is not the first non-punishment for a bank's role in producing or promoting a leveraged mountain of faulty assets. The hush money action is part of a now-two-year SEC program to address, in the commission's own words, 'misconduct that led to or arose from the financial crisis.'

Leaving aside, the tepid characterization 'misconduct' instead of say 'racketeering', these fines don't, and won't, change the banking system. And nowhere does this fining regulatory body suggest a way to do so. It would be refreshing for the SEC, founded in conjunction with the Glass-Steagall Act that separated banks into institutions that dealt with the public's deposit and financing needs from those that created and traded speculative securities for private profit purposes, to suggest a modern equivalent of that act. It might help the commission do its job of protecting the public before unnecessary devastation, not years afterwards, or at the very least, untangle the web of layered borrowing and debt manufacturing at the core of these complex giants.

But, that's not going to happen. Not as long as small fines, absent any form of attached probation, stringent monitoring, or cease-and-desist requirements, can slowly make the issue go away. Seriously, it takes longer to argue a traffic ticket than it took Goldman Sachs to 'agree' to a $550 million settlement on July 15, 2010, after the SEC charged the firm with defrauding investors only three months earlier. People caught with minor amounts of crack or pot undergo stricter plea processes, probationary measures and detainments. 

To date, the SEC has charged four firms with CDO related fraud, including Wachovia, Goldman Sachs, and JPM Chase, who settled for $11 million, $550 million and $156 million respectively. A case against ICP Asset management remains open. 

The commission has charged five firms with making misleading disclosures to investors about mortgage-related risks, including American Home Mortgage, whose former CEO settled for a paltry $2.45 million fine and a 5-year officer and director bar, Citigroup, that settled for a $75 million penalty, Bank of America's Countrywide, whose former CEO, Angelo Mozilo agreed to a $22.5 million penalty and a permanent officer and director bar (a fraction of his pre-crisis take), and New Century, whose executives paid $1.5 million and agreed to a five-year bar. There is an ongoing case against IndyMac Bancorp.

In addition, the SEC charged six firms with concealing the extent of risky mortgage-related assets in mutual and other similar funds. Those included Charles Schwab that settled for a $118 million fine, Evergreen that settled for $40 million to mostly repay investors, TD Ameritrade that settled for $10 million, and State Street that settled to repay investors $300 million.

Separately, Bank of America agreed to a $150 million settlement for misleading its investors about bonuses paid to Merrill Lynch and not disclosing Merrill Lynch's mounting losses. This didn't stop the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department from remaining steadfastly behind the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch make-a-too-big-to-fail-bank-bigger merger, upon which the settlement was based.

In total, the SEC, mildly policing the vast financial system that pushed a criminal musical chairs game of last-one-holding-a-toxic-asset-or-underwater-mortgage-loses, charged 66 entities and individuals with 'misconduct', imposed 19 officer or director bars, and levied $1.5 billion of penalties, disgorgement, and other monetary relief fines. Put that in perspective, say, with the $28 billion in bonuses that JPM scooped up for just 2010, or the $424 billion in total bonuses the top six banks bagged between the crisis book-end years of 2007-2009, or the $128 billion of bonuses Wall Street got last year. Now, consider that not only is the penalty amount a pittance, but the impact of these fines, is even smaller. And, that's the bigger problem with fines, particularly tiny ones. They offer this illusion of a fix that leaves us worse off from a stability perspective than we were before.